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Road pricing has received increasing attention over the past decades, both
in the academic literature and in transport policy circles. Undoubtedly, this
is motivated on the one hand by the increasing need for pricing as an
eﬀective instrument to curb growing transport-related problems such as
congestion and emissions, and on the other by technical advances that
make the implementation of road pricing a realistic policy scenario
rather than a primarily academic curiosum. Some recent examples are, of
course, schemes as implemented in London and Stockholm.
The actual implementation of road pricing poses new questions to
transport economists; that is, the textbook model of road pricing in
which a single government controls a single uniform road with identical
road users under stationary traﬃc conditions may be a great educational
tool to explain the basic economic insights into the nature of external
costs and how Pigouvian charges could optimise these; it is less helpful
when facing the task of designing actual road-pricing policies that will
have to operate in a reality that is, evidently, much more complex than
the stylised world of a simple two-dimensional diagram. This has inspired
various scholars to contribute to a rapidly evolving literature on second-
best road pricing that has amply demonstrated that such complexities
may sometimes drastically aﬀect optimal policy rules and their welfare
consequences.
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Recent contributions to this literature have addressed a variety of issues,
such as network spillovers, heterogeneity of travellers, uncertainty and
stochasticity of traﬃc conditions, restrictions on time-variability of road
prices, and imperfections in related markets such as labour markets
(Small and Verhoef, 2007, provide a review of this literature). Another
issue that has received growing attention, and that will be central in this
special issue, concerns the simultaneous presence of multiple regulators
in a transport network. Speciﬁcally, we will study this in the context of
pricing, but also other types of instrument are considered, notably invest-
ments and hence, capacity choice.
When networks cross boundaries and cover multiple jurisdictions,
diﬀerent governments are involved, who will be controlling substitute or
complementary roads in the same network, pursuing their own objectives.
With toll roads, this leads to situations that resemble classic problems of
horizontal tax competition. Similarly, instances of vertical competition
may arise when diﬀerent governments put prices on the same vehicle-
kilometres, for example, when a local government sets a congestion
charge or a parking fee and a national government imposes a fuel tax.
Either way, policy competition and coordination problems arise when
diﬀerent governments are concerned with the well-being of diﬀerent
groups, and can set tolls and possibly capacities at speciﬁc parts of the
network that are not used exclusively by citizens from the regulating
jurisdiction.
While it is customary — and convenient — to consider only one single
government pursuing one single objective when modelling road pricing, the
situation where more public regulators are active in the same network is in
fact not so far-fetched. In fact, the situation where one single government
controls an isolated network is probably the exception rather than the
rule. Most, if not all, congestion-pricing projects to date have been local
systems. When increasing numbers of cities within a country introduce
such systems, the probability of toll competition on the national network
of course increases; but also, plans for national road-pricing schemes are
under consideration in an increasing number of countries. Germany
already has its scheme for trucks (the so-called ‘MAUT’), and plans for
nationwide schemes are also under development for, for example, The
Netherlands. Tax competition may then easily occur at a higher govern-
mental level, namely between bordering countries — and beyond, when
international transport passes multiple borders. Vertical tax competition
— such as in the example with national fuel taxes and local parking
charges — is, of course, also a very common phenomenon. Whichever
form that road toll competition between governments takes, it is highly
likely to aﬀect the overall eﬃciency impacts of road pricing. It is, of
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course, important to understand how and to what extent, for example, to
design eﬃcient strategies to prevent welfare losses from policy competition
and to assess the relative importance of pursuing these strategies. These
are important motivations for the economic study of toll competition in
transport networks, and hence for the present special issue.
Besides tax competition between governments, toll competition may
also occur with private roads, for example when diﬀerent private road
operators are simultaneously active in the same network, but also when
there is a combination of private and public toll roads. There may of
course also be mixed public–private vertical tax competition even when
there are only private roads in a network, for example when the public
government can levy fuel taxes on all road users and thus taxes the same
base as do the private toll road operators. Given the increasing interest
in private road provision, these situations seem far from imaginary.
Furthermore, problems of this type are not restricted to road transport
alone. Fare, tax, and capacity competition may also occur in networks for
scheduled services, such as rail and aviation, and may then involve multiple
parties; for example, governments, nodal operators (airports or stations),
link operators (notably in rail), and service providers (airlines and railway
companies); in various combinations.
The above brief introduction implies that studies into the economics of
strategic interactions between operators in transport networks can be
classiﬁed according to a fair number of relevant dimensions. The network
considered can allow for parallel links (substitutes), serial links (comple-
ments), both (in bigger networks), or none of these (when a single link is
considered). The policy instruments can include pricing (tolls), capacity
choice, both, and in principle other instruments also (for example, con-
venience, reliability, and so on). The operators can be public welfare
maximisers, private proﬁt maximisers, and also both types can be present
simultaneously in a network. The number of operators can be one (for
example, when ‘competing’ with an unpriced link), two (in a duopoly
setting), or more than two, where the latter may include the possibility of
endogenous entry. The game-theoretical set-up could assume Nash behav-
iour or Stackelberg leadership, could involve single or multiple stages (in
particular, when both capacities and tolls are endogenous), and might con-
sider one-shot or repeated games. The organisation structure of network
operators can involve a simple bi-level structure, as would be relevant for
road transport when there are road operators and atomistic users; but it
could also have multiple layers when, for example, end-users purchase
services from service operators (for example, airlines), who in turn purchase
services from nodal or link-based infrastructure operators (for example,
airports), who in turn may be under the direct control of public regulators
Toll Competition in Transport Networks Verhoef
363
(as could, in fact, be the service operators). The relevant structure is, of
course, related to yet another dimension, namely which transport
mode(s) are considered, and whether this implies a uni- or multi-modal
network. Undoubtedly, one could think of further dimensions of interest,
but already this list implies that there is a huge potential for diﬀerent
possible cases of interest to study in this ﬁeld. No surprise, then, that the
contributors to this special issue had little diﬃculty in identifying relevant
and challenging questions for study in their respective papers. Let me give a
brief preview of the problems studied, without giving away too much of the
various papers’ main conclusions.
The ﬁrst paper by Se-il Mun and Ki-jung Ahn considers road pricing in
a serial two-link network, for the various ownership regimes that may arise
when both of these links can be untolled, tolled by a private regulator, or
tolled by a public regulator. They ﬁnd that the pricing rules diﬀer substan-
tially from their counterparts as applying on a parallel two-link network,
and also study how the initial degree of congestion aﬀects the relative per-
formance of the various regimes.
Andre´ de Palma, Robin Lindsey, and Fang Wu, in the second paper,
study road pricing on a larger network, with dynamic congestion. They
are particularly concerned with the impacts of the following ‘attributes’
of tolling regimes: the goals of the operator (private proﬁt-maximising
behaviour versus public welfare maximisation); the set of links that can
be tolled in relation to the network structure (pay-lanes, toll roads,
cordons); and the time structure of the tolls (ﬂat tolls, coarse step tolls,
and ﬁne step tolls). The paper provides new insights on, for example, the
relative performance of diﬀerent time structures for diﬀerent sets of links
and diﬀerent ownership structures.
The third paper is by Lei Zhang, David Levinson and Shanjiang Zhu.
They consider toll and capacity choices for heterogeneous users by public
and private operators in an agent-based setting, in which traditional equili-
brium analysis is replaced by an evolutionary modelling approach in which
decision makers (both travellers and road operators) adjust their decisions
according to prespeciﬁed behavioural updating rules. The model provides
important insights into how a network may develop over time under the
presence of multiple road operators.
A similar dynamic view on endogenous network development is pro-
vided in the fourth paper, written by myself.1 This paper focuses on the
endogenous development of a network in terms of links, their capacities,
1To avoid any possible conﬂicts of interest, this paper was handled, in a standard review procedure, by
the journal’s editor-in-chief. Only after ﬁnal acceptance in that procedure was it decided to include the
paper in this special issue.
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and their tolls, under various regimes. One is a free-entry regime for private
road operators. The second is a regime in which road concessions are
auctioned oﬀ. As a benchmark, a third regime is a particular second-best
sequence of link additions to the network. Although some structure is
imposed on allowable network conﬁgurations, the model is constructed
such that it allows for both serial and parallel competition between toll
roads.
The ﬁfth paper is by Andrew Yuen, Leonardo Basso and Anming
Zhang. It is the ﬁrst of two papers in this special issue to consider the inter-
actions between congestion pricing in a gateway or (air-)port and that on
infrastructure in a downstream hinterland. In this paper, an oligopolistic
market structure of carriers active in the gateway is considered. This com-
prises the second layer of the model (‘below’ the two local governments);
the third layer is the price-taking behaviour underlying ﬁnal demand.
Bruno de Borger, Stef Proost and Kurt van Dender, in the sixth paper,
are also concerned with a port–hinterland structure, but they consider the
case of two competing ports, each with a monopolistic operator, under the
jurisdictions of two diﬀerent local governments, with region speciﬁc infra-
structure enabling hinterland transport to a joint ﬁnal destination. They
consider port pricing, and capacity choice for both the port and the hinter-
land infrastructure. Again, the focus is on interactions between tolls (and
now also capacities) between parallel and serial links, and the implied
welfare eﬀects.
The seventh and last paper, by Kenneth Button, concerns aviation. His
primary interest is the impact of market power of airlines upon the desir-
ability of diﬀerent types of instrument to cope with airport congestion.
The central question addressed is whether insights from the road pricing
literature can be directly transferred to the case of congested airports, or
whether the market structure and other technical diﬀerences between
congested road and air traﬃc may make other economic instruments,
notably tradable slots, a more desirable way of coping with congestion
than traditional Pigouvian taxes.
The various contributions in this special issue make clear that the
modelling of toll and capacity competition between infrastructure opera-
tors is a complex task, but rewarding in the sense that the ultimate
economic eﬃciency of the network usually depends strongly on the
nature of the operators, the characteristics of the network, and the way
in which operators are distributed over the network and, if relevant, how
the market is regulated. There are, therefore, no universal answers to
questions concerning the most desirable (industrial) organisation of opera-
tors over transport networks. Hopefully, the various contributions in this
special issue contribute to our understanding of such questions and of
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ways to address them using economic theory, at the same time providing
inspiration for further study in this ﬁeld.
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